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Mayo Framework and Preemption Question 什么技术在美国是被专利保护的?

Mayo Framework and Preemption Question: what is patentable under 35 USC 101. The question of patentable subject matter is nominally grounded in the statute 35 U.S.C. § 101: patent rights to anyone who “invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”

During the course of enforcing the law, the Supreme has interpreted that the statute also prohibits patents on abstract ideas, products of nature, and natural phenomena.

In Mayo v. Prometheus at the Supreme Court raises the question of whether a patent claim that covers correlations between blood tests and patient health is ‘patentable’ under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Court’s analysis creates a framework for patent eligibility in which almost any method claim of “the law of nature” can be invalidated.

Prometheus has a method patent of analyzing the effectiveness of thiopurine drugs for treating gastrointestinal disorders.  Prometheus offers a blood test which analyzes metabolite levels of thiopurine drugs in patients.  Mayo sought to offer a competing blood test at a lower price. 

Prometheus promptly sued Mayo for infringement.

Claim 1 of the relevant patent reads as follows:
    (1) A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising:
(a) administering a drug providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and
(b) determining the level of 6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder,
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8×10^8 red blood cells indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject and
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 8×10^8 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said subject.

1.  The preemption question

One of Mayo’s principal arguments in its brief and at oral argument is that Prometheus’s patent preempts the use of a law of nature — namely, the relationship between metabolite levels and patient health. 

Justice Kennedy began the preemption questioning by asking whether a system of measurements that continually monitor drug retention would be patentable.  Mayo’s counsel responded that it would depend on the breadth of the claims.  “Claim specificity is key.”  According to Mayo, if Prometheus’s patent had provided competitors room to develop different, more accurate metabolite levels it may have passed the 101 test.  But, in this case Prometheus’s patent preempted any reduction in dosage if a patient’s metabolite levels were above 400 pmol.  In Mayo’s view, “incidental” steps added to a natural phenomenon were insufficient to avoid preemption.  Thus, any patent consisting only of a natural phenomenon and “incidental steps” would be preempted under Mayo’s test.

The Supreme Court agrees with Mayo’s argument in its decision.

the US Patent & Trademark Office has since distributed a short memorandum to its examiners providing guidance.

Examiners must continue to ensure that claims, particularly process claims, are not directed to an exception to eligibility such that the claim amounts to a monopoly on the law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea itself. In addition, to be patent-eligible, a claim that includes an exception should include other elements or combination of elements such that, in practice, the claimed product or process amounts to significantly more than a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea conventional steps specified at a high level of generality appended thereto.    

The Supreme Court found that because the laws of nature recited by the patent claims – the relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a thiopurine drug dosage will prove ineffective or cause harm – are not themselves patent eligible, the claimed processes are likewise not patent-eligible unless they have additional features that provide practical assurance that the processes are genuine applications of those laws rather than drafting efforts designed to monopolize the correlations.

什么技术在美国是被专利保护的?美国专利法规定了4大类别:新的有用的1)方法;2)机器;3)生产物;4)合成物。
在执行专利法过程中,最高法院在对专利法的保护范围阐释中,进一步排除了下列内容的专利保护:1)抽象想法;2)自然产物;3)自然现象。
在Mayo v. Prometheus专利侵权案中,Prometheus有一个方法专利,即通过检测病人血液中硫化嘌呤的量来确定医疗效果。Prometheus 提供一个血液检测试剂盒。该试剂盒使用这个专利方法来检测病人血液。Mayo也提供一个相似的试剂盒,只是价格更便宜。Prometheus于是起诉Mayo 专利侵权。
当大法官问,连续监测一个药物在血液中的含量可不可以被专利保护时,Mayo 的律师的观点是,应该取决于专利权诉求范围。如果该专利权诉求范围可以允许竞争对手改进检测范围,而不仅仅是自然现象,就可以被专利保护。
最高法院判Mayo 没侵权,Prometheus 专利无效。
美专利局于是出笼了专利审查指导,要求专利审查员在审查方法专利时,进一步考虑该专利申请是否具有比仅仅描述自然现象远多的应用内容。

Tom Brady of New England Patriots won a big legal victory – Tom Brady 又赢了

On September 3, 2015, Tom Brady of New England Patriots won a big legal victory over his four-game suspension imposed by Roger Goodell.

The simplest explanation for Judge Berman’s decision is that the NFL failed to show that it applied Article 46 of the collective bargaining agreement in a fair and consistent way. Federal judges rarely vacate arbitration awards yet Judge Berman felt compelled to vacate Brady’s suspension after finding so many problems in the NFL’s application of Article 46.

First it relates to Brady’s arbitration hearing with Goodell on June 23 where Goodell denied a request by NFLPA attorneys to question NFL general counsel Jeffrey Pash and to access the league’s investigative notes. Mr. Jeffrey Pash edited the Wells Report before its release. Judge Berman regarded Goodell’s decisions on these issues as preventing Brady from enjoying a credible opportunity to make his case. If Brady can’t confront his accuser and study the evidence used to punish him, how can he effectively defend against the accuser’s accusations? Judge Berman stressed that denial of access to key witnesses can be grounds to vacate an arbitration award.

Secondly the notification given by NFL is confusing which failed to explain under which set of rules that Brady was being punished. The Wells Report used the league’s Integrity of the Game and Enforcement of Competitive Rules policy, a document not collectively bargained with the NFLPA, to find that it was “more probable than not” that Brady had “general awareness” of a football scheme supposedly hatched by two equipment assistants.

But in his testimony NFL executive vice president Troy Vincent referenced the Game-Day Operations Manual, also not collectively bargained with the NFLPA. as a crucial document in finding Brady at fault.

Judge Berman seemed perplexed as to what degree non-collectively bargained documents should be considered sources of authority to punish Brady.

Third, Brady had not received adequate notice of discipline. The steroid policy, wrote Judge Berman, “cannot reasonably be used as a comparator for Brady’s four-game suspension for alleged ball deflation by others . . . [the steroid policy sets forth procedures] none of which has anything to do with Brady’s conduct and/or his discipline.” 

Fourth, there is lack of consistency in NFL discipline. In prior instances of players being implicated by equipment tampering, those players were fined, warned or not punished in any way. It was never made clear why Brady was treated differently and significantly worse.

Lastly,  Goodell as arbitrator was clearly not neutral. While Article 46 permits Goodell to serve as the arbitrator for player appeals, Judge Berman noted that the “law of the shop”—which compels consistency and fairness in arbitration awards—bars Goodell from rendering a decision that may have been compromised by bias.

9月3号,新英格兰爱国者球队明星后卫Tom Brady 赢了。这回是法庭里。法官Berman取消了NFL仲裁员对他停赛4场的惩罚。

联邦法庭很少取消调解员的决定。不过这回法官发现NFL仲裁过程有很多程序问题,整个仲裁过程,使用的处罚规则,仲裁证据,标准都前后不一致,而且仲裁员Goodell 也缺乏中立。Brady 事前也没有被足够通告。这样的结果,是无法保证公平的。