The failure to obtain an opinion of counsel is considered in deciding willful blindness for active inducement of patent infringement.

In the September 14, 2015 decision, Suprema, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, Fed. Cir. No. 12-1170, 9/14/2015, the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s findings of infringement and violations of 19 U.S.C. §1337. Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Among them is importing “articles that . . . infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent.” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i). The International Trade Commission (“Commission”) interpreted this provision to cover importation of goods that, after importation, are used by the importer to directly infringe at the inducement of the goods’ seller.

Suprema, Inc., is a Korean company that makes hardware for scanning fingerprints, including its RealScan line of fingerprint scanners. Suprema sells the scanners to Mentalix, Inc.  Suprema does not make or sell this software. Instead, it ships each scanner with a “software development kit” (“SDK”) that is used for developing custom programs that control the functions of its scanners. Mentalix, Inc., is an American company that purchases Suprema’s scanners and imports those scanners into the United States. It writes custom software, called FedSubmit, which uses Suprema’s SDK to control and operate the scanners. Mentalix then bundles its software with the scanners and resells the bundle within the United States.

Cross Match is the assignee of  U.S. Patent Nos. 7,203,344 (“the ’344 patent”). The claims of the ’344 patent are drawn to fingerprint scanning systems and methods that generate a fingerprint image, process that image to identify key regions, and determine image quality. An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) conducted a thorough infringement analysis, expressly finding that each of the limitations of claim 19 was practiced by Suprema’s scanner products.

In addition to considering the issue of direct infringement, the Commission also considered whether Suprema induced infringement of claim 19.  The Commission examined the elements required to support an inducement finding, and considered the inducer’s knowledge regarding patent infringement. The Commission explained that the knowledge prong is met by a showing of willful blindness, and laid out the requirements for willful blindness: (1) the defendant’s subjective belief in the high probability that a fact exists; and (2) the defendant’s taking of deliberate steps to avoid learning of that fact

The Commission found that Suprema “‘willfully blinded’ itself to the infringing nature of Mentalix’s activities,” which Suprema “had actively encouraged.”  The Commission found that Suprema was successful in its attempts to develop various functions covered by the ’344 patent into its products which supports the finding that Suprema subjectively believed in the high probability that Cross Match’s scanner technology was patented. 

The Commission also found that Suprema deliberately avoided acquiring knowledge of the ’344 patent. The fact that Suprema failed to obtain opinion of counsel, through which the ’344 patent would have been uncovered since it was owned by Cross Match, supports the finding. The Commission reasoned that the search would have included an analysis of whether Suprema infringed Cross Match patents.  Accordingly, the Commission found that Suprema had willfully blinded itself to the existence of the ’344 patent and “deliberately shielded itself from the nature of the infringing activities it actively encouraged and facilitated Mentalix to make.” 

The Court agreed and reasoned that with the help of counsel, Suprema would have discovered the patents infringed, therefore, it rejected the argument that requiring research into every reference in a competitor’s patent would place too high a burden on manufacturers. The failure to obtain an opinion of counsel may be considered in deciding willful blindness for active inducement of patent infringement.

For Intellectual Property licensees, where is the best venue place for filing bankruptcy? 对于拥有知识产权许可的公司,哪里是最佳法院区申请破产?

For Intellectual Property licensees, where is the best venue place for filing bankruptcy?

Generally large Chapter 11 cases choose the venue of Delaware and the Southern District of New York. Research shows that companies that file in Delaware – and its close competitor district, the Manhattan Division of the Southern District of New York – are significantly more likely to survive, according to an article by two UCLA School of Law professors.  A better chance of saving jobs, paying creditors and protecting shareholders could explain why bankruptcy lawyers and lenders to bankrupt companies might choose Delaware and New York over other districts.  The one variable that determines Delaware’s and New York’s edge is the experience of judges handling the cases. The relationship between judge experience and bankruptcy survival is probably the most important. Bankruptcy participants can thus increase the survival level, simply by shifting cases to more experienced judges.  And since 1989, the Wilmington court has built a reputation for its level of experience and consistency in handling big Chapter 11 cases.

However, in October 2014, GT Advanced Technology (GT), a Delaware corporation, filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 in the District of New Hampshire, the First Circuit. The full reasons are not clear, but there are actually several advantages for an IP licensee debtor to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the First Circuit.

In-licensed IP rights – the right of a debtor to use IP as licensee – are often among the most valuable assets in a business bankruptcy case. Section 365 concerns whether a debtor can reject, assume or assign executory contracts.  An executory contract is a contract under which both parties have unperformed obligations. Most IP licenses qualify as executory contracts because their standard terms usually create ongoing material obligations, such as the duty to maintain IP, territorial restrictions and payment of yearly royalties. Section 365(c) precludes those executory contracts from being assumed or assigned by a debtor if (1) the other party does not accept performance from an entity other than the debtor; and (2) the other party does not consent to the assumption or assignment.

There is sharp disagreement as to whether a debtor can assume (keep for itself) an IP license without the consent of the licensor between the Third Circuit and First Circuit. The Third Circuit uses a “hypothetical test” under which the ability of a debtor to assume is based on whether the debtor is hypothetically permitted to assign the license to a third party even when no assignment is planned. Conversely, an IP licensee debtor may only assume the license if the licensor consents.

In the First Circuit, however, the courts have adopted the “actual test” under which a court must determine whether a debtor licensee actually intends to transfer the license, and if so, section 365 (c) prevents the debtor from assuming the license. This provides two significant advantages: 1) the debtor is allowed to keep using the licensing rights to continue business operations; 2) the debtor may be able to effect some “de facto assignments” of license rights through a stock sale. In Institute Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp. 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1996), the First Circuit held that a debtor’s sale of all of its stock did not constitute an a assignment of the debtor’s patent license because the debtor remained to be counter party of the license.

对于拥有知识产权许可的公司,哪里是最佳法院区申请破产?

一般大的破产公司都会选择在特拉华州和纽约州南部法院区来申请破产。研究表明,在特拉华州和纽约南区申请破产的公司更容易生存下来,它们有更好的机会保留工作,支付债权人和保护股东。其中一个重要因素是特拉华州和纽约州的法官有丰富的处理破产案件的经验。而法官的经验和一致性与破产后生存有重要关系。仅仅通过转移案件到被更有经验的法官处理,破产公司就增加了生存的机会,何乐而不为呢。

然而,2014年十月,GT先进技术公司(GT),一个特拉华州注册公司,却在区新罕布什尔州第一巡回法院提出破产申请。虽然整个的原因尚不清楚,但实际上在第一巡回法院对拥有IP许可授权合同的债务公司确有几个优点。

知识产权许可授权往往是破产企业最有价值的资产之一。破产法第365允许债务人拒绝,保留或转让已生效待执行合同。已生效待执行合同是合同双方都有尚未履行的义务。大多数IP许可授权都是已生效待执行合同,因为其标准条款通常都包括持续的合同义务:例如有义务维护IP,地域限制和支付每年的使用费。但破产法第365C)不允许债务人保留或转让已生效待执行合同如果(1)合同对方不接受除了债务人之外的其他实体执行合同; 和(2)合同对方不同意债务人保留或转让。

但是第三和第一巡回对于债务人是否可以保持IP授权合同有尖锐的分歧。第三巡回采用了假想试验,即债务人是否可以保留IP授权合同是基于在假想情况下,债务人是否被允许转让该IP授权许可,而不是实际上债务人是否有转让的计划和意愿。其结果是,在第三巡回法院,有IP许可授权的债务人往往必须经过IP授权人的同意才可能保留该IP授权许可合同

但是,第一巡回法院采取实际测试,即法院必须确定债务人是否实际上有转让该IP授权的计划和意愿,如果有,第365c)将阻止债务人保留该IP授权合同。这提供了两个明显优势:1)债务人可能被允许继续使用该IP许可权进行经营,不需IP授权人同意; 2)债务人能够通过出售股份来实现实际转让许可权。在 In Institute Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp. 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1996)中,第一巡回法院认为债务人出售全部股票不构成专利授权转让,因为债务人仍然拥有对专利许可授权方的合同义务。